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Current Legal Developments: The Arctic
Abstract
The planting of a flag in a titanium canister on the seabed at the North Pole in August 2007 on the part of
the Russian Federation and efforts by the other Arctic Ocean littoral states to reinforce their territorial and,
particularly, maritime jurisdictional claims in the region, led to the Arctic becoming the focus of
considerable global media attention in recent months. Much of this coverage has been alarmist in tone,
replete with tales of a “scramble” or “race” for the Arctic, talk of an Arctic “land-grab”, and unease over a
resultant Arctic resource “gold rush”. Although some of the media and even diplomatic responses have
been, to say the least, somewhat misleading, these events have been set against the backdrop of some
startling and potentially profound changes to the Arctic environment which have also served to heighten
concerns over events in the region. The aim of this paper is to highlight key developments and explore
some of the legal and policy issues that arise.
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Current Legal Developments
The Arctic
An Arctic Scramble? Opportunities and Threats in the (Formerly)
Frozen North
The planting of a ﬂag in a titanium canister on the seabed at the North Pole
in August 2007 on the part of the Russian Federation and eﬀorts by the other
Arctic Ocean littoral states to reinforce their territorial and, particularly, maritime jurisdictional claims in the region, led to the Arctic becoming the focus of
considerable global media attention in recent months. Much of this coverage
has been alarmist in tone, replete with tales of a “scramble”1 or “race”2 for the
Arctic, talk of an Arctic “land-grab”,3 and unease over a resultant Arctic
resource “gold rush”.4 Although some of the media and even diplomatic
responses have been, to say the least, somewhat misleading, these events have
been set against the backdrop of some startling and potentially profound
changes to the Arctic environment which have also served to heighten concerns
over events in the region. The aim of this paper is to highlight key developments and explore some of the legal and policy issues that arise.

The Changing Arctic—Unfreezing Seas
The Arctic Ocean is a semi-enclosed sea5 surrounded by ﬁve coastal states:
Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway (Svalbard), Russia and the United
States of America (USA). A further three states, Finland, Iceland and Sweden,

1

For example, see B. Leapman, “Denmark joins race to claim North Pole”, Sunday Telegraph,
14 August 2007.
2
M. Richardson, “Race is on for Arctic resources”, The Canberra Times, 10 September 2007.
3
D. R. Sands, “Sea treaty sparks rivalries”, Washington Times, 12 November 2007.
4
P. Reynolds, “Russia ahead in Arctic ‘gold rush’ ”, BBC News, 1 August 2007, <http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6925853.stm>; and P. Reynolds, “The Arctic’s new gold rush”, BBC News,
25 October 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4354036.stm>.
5
The question of whether the Arctic Ocean qualiﬁes as a semi-enclosed sea within the
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008
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are also generally considered to be Arctic states.6 The Arctic’s most pronounced
feature, at least until very recently, has been a large, mostly ice-covered ocean
throughout the year. However, profound changes appear to be taking place in
the Arctic land- and, especially, seascape. The 2004 Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment catalogued the range of impacts that are occurring in a warming
Arctic from human-inﬂuenced climatic change. The report concluded that
the temperature has risen at twice the rate as in the rest of the world in the past
few decades and there is increasing evidence of widespread melting of glaciers,
permafrost and sea ice.7 These impacts are expected to intensify and over the
next 100 years temperatures would rise by 3–5°C over the land and by up to
7°C over the oceans,8 driving signiﬁcant changes through the ecological and
socio-economic structure of the Arctic.9
On 14 September 2007, the European Space Agency reported that the area
covered by sea ice in the Arctic had shrunk to its lowest level since the initiation of satellite measurements 30 years ago.10 The United States National Snow
and Ice Data Centre reported that the average ﬁve-day mean sea ice extent in
September 2007 was 4.13 million km2. This was compared to the 1979–2000
average of 6.74 million km2—a massive reduction to the average extent of
2.61 million km2.11 The record 2007 sea ice reduction followed the 2005
record minimum of 5.32 million km2, an additional loss of over 1 million km2
from 2005. This sudden and dramatic loss can be viewed in the context of
reductions in sea ice cover over the last 10 years of approximately 100,000 km2

meaning of Article 122 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)
has been described as something of a “vexed question” in itself, not least because of the obligation for bordering states to cooperate under Article 123 of the same Treaty. See R. Rayfuse,
“Melting Moments: The future of polar oceans governance in a warming world”, Review of
European Community and International Environmental Law (RECIEL) (2007) 16 (2): 196–216,
at 210.
6
Although the most common deﬁnition of the Arctic region as a whole is the area lying north
of the Arctic Circle at 66°33' north, a variety of deﬁnitions for the Arctic region as a whole
exist, dependent on the issue or context under discussion. A useful summary of deﬁnitional
options is provided by Rayfuse, ibid., at 197.
7
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, “Impacts of A Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment” (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) 146 pp, available at <http://www.
acia.uaf.edu>.
8
Ibid., at 10.
9
See, for example, D. Barber, L. Fortier and M. Byers, “The incredible shrinking sea ice”,
Options Politiques (December 2005–January 2006): 66–71.
10
European Space Agency (ESA), “Satellites witness lowest Arctic sea ice coverage in history”
(2007) ESA News, available at <http://www.esa.int/esaCP/SEMYTC13J6F_index_0.html>.
11
See National Snow and Ice Data Centre (NSIDC), Arctic Sea Ice News, Fall 2007, available
at <http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/20070810_index.html>.
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per year on average. Forecast models of summer sea ice extent show a continuing downward trend of cover,12 but debate continues over the period when the
Arctic will be ice free (in summer). Scientists have commented that despite
the uncertainty in forecasting models through the 21st century, the rapid
loss of sea ice could result in a sea ice-free summer by 2030,13 or perhaps
even sooner.14
Despite this apparently compelling evidence of the impact of humaninduced climate change on the Arctic, it has been argued that this is not necessarily the case and that some of the changes being witnessed in high northern
latitudes are in fact part of long-term cyclical processes.15

A Scramble for what?
Increasing access to Arctic waters and recent moves to support extended
continental shelf claims in the central Arctic Ocean are often viewed in
resource access terms. In particular, the Arctic has been portrayed as a major
potential source, or ‘last frontier’, of (sub)seabed energy resources. Consequently, the Arctic has most commonly been seen through the lens of escalating energy prices and related global energy security concerns. Indeed, at the
time of writing, the price of oil was ﬂirting with US$100 per barrel16—a level

12

M. Serreze, M. Holland and J. Stroeve1, “Perspectives on the Arctic shrinking sea-ice cover”
(2007) 315 Science 1533–1536.
13
See comments in: D. Adam, “Ice-free Arctic could be here in 23 years”, The Guardian,
Wednesday, 5 September 2007, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/
sep/05/climatechange.sciencenews>.
14
For example, Louis Fortier, Scientiﬁc Director of the Canadian research network ArcticNet,
suggested that sea ice was melting faster than predicted and that consequently the Arctic
Ocean could be free of ice in the summer as soon as 2010 or 2015, “and it’s probably going to
happen even faster than that.” See M. White, “‘Frightening’ projection: ice-free passage possible by 2010”, National Post (Canada), 15 November 2007. Even more alarmingly it was
subsequently suggested in December 2007 that the Arctic could be ice-free in summer by
2013. Professor Wieslaw Maslowski of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,
whose team includes members from NASA and the Institute of Oceanology, Polish Academy
of Sciences (PAS), remarked that the 2013 projection does not take into account the Arctic ice
minima of 2005 and 2007 and that as such even this estimate may be “too conservative”. See
J. Amos, “Arctic summers ice-free ‘by 2013’”, BBC News, 12 December 2007, <http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7139797.stm>.
15
See “NASA sees Arctic Ocean circulation do an about-face”, available at <www.physorg.
com/news114189626.html>.
16
See BBC News “Oil price at record $100 a barrel”, 2 January 2008; <http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/business/7168664.stm>.
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virtually unthinkable even a few months ago. Such prices and advances in
recovery technologies, especially in deep water, help to explain interest in the
Arctic as well as other underexplored oﬀshore hydrocarbon provinces.
The statistical authority often cited to support this view is the United States
Geological Survey’s (USGS) 2000 estimate that the Arctic may hold as much
as 25% of the world’s undiscovered resources.17 Russian estimates similarly
indicate that the Arctic’s potential energy reserves are signiﬁcant.18
Breathless expectations of an Arctic hydrocarbon ‘Eldorado’ should, however, be treated with considerable caution. Such predictions should be tempered by the fact that little serious exploration has taken place in Arctic waters
due to the presence of sea ice coupled with severe environmental conditions.
Consequently, exploration eﬀorts have been largely restricted to a narrow
peripheral zone of the Arctic Ocean where ice cover has traditionally been
absent, or at least thinner, on a seasonal basis. It is also understood that most,
if not all, of the oil- and gas-bearing sedimentary basins of the Arctic fall
within 200 nautical miles (nm)19 of the coast and thus within the EEZs of the
Arctic littoral states, meaning that claims to the outer continental shelf are
unlikely to yield an oil and gas bonanza.20
This view has been underlined by a recent report employing detailed geoscientiﬁc analysis of individual Arctic basins, backed by oil industry data on

17

See, for example, The Economist, “Drawing lines in melting ice”, 18 August 2007. It is
notable that the USGS ﬁndings relate to undiscovered oil and that a summary of the report
does not, in fact, even make mention of the Arctic speciﬁcally. See <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs062–03/FS-062–03.pdf>.
18
Russian estimates of potential seabed resources in the Arctic have been reportedly in the
range of 9–10 billion tonnes of fuel equivalent, although oﬃcial Russian government estimates are put at up to 5 billion tonnes. See G. Faulconbridge, “Russia to ﬁle Arctic claim to
(sic) U.N. this year: radio”, Ottawa Citizen, 30 October 2007. See also P. Baev, “Russia’s Race
for the Arctic and the New Geopolitics of the North Pole” (October 2007), Occasional Paper, The
Jamestown Foundation, 17 pp, at 6–7. Available from: <http://jamestown.org/docs/Jamestown-BaevRussiaArctic.pdf>.
19
Some commentators maintain that the correct abbreviation for a nautical mile is “M” and
that “nm” should only be used for nanometres. However, “nm” is widely used by many authorities (for example the UN Oﬃce of Ocean Aﬀairs and the Law of the Sea) and appears to cause
less confusion than “M”, which is often assumed to be an abbreviation for metres.
20
R. Macnab, P. Neto and R. van de Poll, “Cooperative preparations for determining the
outer limit of the juridical continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean: A model for regional collaboration in other parts of the world?”, Proceedings of a Continental Shelf Workshop hosted
by the Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI), Buenos Aires, 13–15 November
2000. Reprinted with permission in Boundary and Security Bulletin (2001) 9(1) (Spring):
86–96, at 88.
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exploration wells and existing discoveries, the ﬁndings of which were considerably less optimistic than the estimates outlined above.21 Not only were
estimates for Arctic resource potential substantially lower,22 but it was also
concluded that the Arctic is predominantly a gas province.23 This has signiﬁcant
implications, as gas is much harder to transport to markets and required technologies are still in their infancy, meaning that exploitation of a large portion
of Arctic gas resources is likely to be delayed until 2050.24 Overall it was stated
that these ﬁndings were “disappointing from a world oil resource base perspective” and “calls into question the long-considered view that the Arctic
represents one of the last great oil and gas frontiers and a strategic energy supply cache for the US.”25
This is not, however, to wholly discount the idea of major oil and gas ﬁnds
being made in the Arctic—these may just not necessarily be on the same scale
as some optimistic reports may suggest. Furthermore, the strong perception
that appears to exist that such seabed riches may exist is in itself a powerful
factor in motivating claims to maritime jurisdiction.
It has also been suggested that the seabed of the Arctic Ocean may harbour
substantial reserves of gas hydrates, which may be exploited in the future.26
While the potential may well be very large, the technologies required to exploit
these resources, especially from such remote areas and in such hostile conditions, mean that their exploitation currently remains over the horizon.
With regard to the marine living resources of the Arctic Ocean, their extent
and sustainability are similarly not well known. It is, however, thought
that Arctic species, which are generally slow-growing due to their cold
environment, are likely to be especially vulnerable to overﬁshing.27 In light
of the depletion of stocks elsewhere, especially in waters beyond the national
jurisdiction of coastal states—the so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’—new

21

The joint Wood MacKenzie and Fugro Robertson study, Future of the Arctic, was released
on 1 November 2007. See “Arctic role diminished in world oil supply”, Wood Mackenzie Press
Release, available at <http://www.woodmacresearch.com/cgi-bin/corp/portal/corp/corpPressDetail.jsp?oid=751298>.
22
3 million barrels of oil equivalent per day (mboepd) liquids and 5 mboepd gas at peak.
Ibid.
23
It was reported that 85 per cent of discovered resource and 74 per cent of exploration
potential was as gas.Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Andrew Latham, Vice President, Energy Consulting, Wood MacKenzie. See “Arctic role
diminished in world oil supply”, ibid.
26
Macnab et al., supra note 20, at 88.
27
Barber et al., supra note 9, at 68.
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ﬁshing opportunities in an ice-free Arctic will require strict management
if they are not to be short-lived.28 The Arctic may also prove to be a source
of useful genetic material in view of the region’s unique environmental
conditions, raising biodiversity preservation issues and the management of
bioprospecting.29
The signiﬁcant reduction in sea ice in recent times has raised the prospects
for the opening up of long-sought navigational routes, the Northwest Passage—
aptly termed the “Arctic Grail”30 —and the Northern Sea Route (formerly
known as the Northeast Passage),31 and even a transpolar route.32 Satellite
imagery from September 2007 showed the Northwest Passage to be completely ice free and the alternative route, the Northern Sea Route, to be partially blocked. However, in the 2005 sea ice minimum, the Northern Sea
Route was partially open.33 The prospect of seasonal and permanently open
shipping routes in the Arctic could signiﬁcantly cut the distances that need to
be traversed, for instance between Europe and the east coast of North America
and Asia. Indeed, it has been suggested that, if navigable, the Northwest Passage would oﬀer a 7,000 km saving on the route between Asia and the East
Coast of the USA over the route via the Panama Canal, whilst the Northern
Sea Route would entail a 40 percent distance savings on the transit between
northern Europe and northeast Asia as compared with a route via the Suez or
Panama Canals.34 With regard to the trans-polar route, the ﬁgures are even

28

See, for example, Rayfuse, supra note 5, at 212–213.
Macnab et al., supra note 20, at 88; Rayfuse, supra note 5, at 213.
30
See P. Berton, The Arctic Grail: The Quest for the Northwest Passage and the North Pole,
1818–1909 (McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1988). See also M. Byers and S. Lalonde,
“Who controls the Northwest Passage?” Discussion paper prepared in advance of a conference
on “Canada’s Arctic Waters in International Law and Diplomacy”, National Arts Centre, Ottawa,
14 June 2006, available at <www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/ﬁles/Publications/7Jun2006ArcticWaters
DiscussionPaper.do>.
31
See, for example, W. V. Dunlap, Transit Passage in Russian Arctic Straits, Maritime Brieﬁng
1 (7) (International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham, 1996), 84 pp.
32
Iceland has reportedly been keen to promote such a route across the central Arctic Ocean
between the Fram and Bering Straits, whereby cargo-carrying icebreakers could shuttle back
and forth between transshipment points in Alaska and Iceland, where cargos would be
exchanged with conventional vessels (R. Macnab, personal communication, November 2007).
See also Breaking the Ice Arctic Development and Maritime Transportation: Prospects of the Transarctic Route—Impact and Opportunities, Summary of Presentations delivered during a Conference organised by the Icelandic Government, Akureyki, Iceland, March 27–28, 2007, 31 pp;
available at <http://arcticportal.org/uploads/4L/PJ/4LPJRQYK8NK3h1pOCAST5Q/BreakingTheIce_ensk-tgfa.pdf >.
33
See NSIDC, supra note 11.
34
See Byers and Lalonde, supra note 30, at 3–5. Richardson, supra note 2, cites the following
29
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more dramatic, with a voyage between Hamburg, Germany and Kobe, Japan
being 11,225 nm via the traditional route through the Suez Canal compared
with around 5,000 nm over the North Pole.35 Although the signiﬁcantly
reduced distances involved represent an enticing prospect for the international
shipping sector, distance alone does not tell the whole story. Such savings may
be at least partially illusory, as reduced distances will not necessarily translate
into equivalent savings in terms of transit times and navigational costs. This is
because, although sea ice may well have thinned and cleared enough to enable
transit of these routes, ice will remain a prominent feature of the high northern latitudes, presenting a signiﬁcant potential hazard to navigation and thus
necessitating cautious and slow navigation.36
The prospect of the Northwest Passage opening up to shipping has, however, led to the re-emergence of the dispute between Canada and the US over
the legal status of the waterway—an issue that was a largely redundant one
whilst the Passage was eﬀectively impassable.37 There is also legal uncertainty
over the status of formerly ice-covered waters in the Arctic and the application
of Article 234 of the LOSC that deals with the application of pollution prevention laws applicable to vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the
EEZ.38 As previously noted, however, discussion of the Northwest Passage and
other Arctic Sea routes opening up to commercial traﬃc is, however, arguably

example: “‘A container cargo ship travelling at 21 knots between Japan’s Yokohama port and
Rotterdam in the Netherlands takes 29 days if it goes around the Cape of Good Hope at the
southern tip of Africa. It takes 22 days via the Strait of Malacca and Singapore and on to
Europe through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea. But the same ship would take just
15 days via the Arctic Ocean.”
35
P. R. M. Toomey, “Global Warming: Arctic Shipping”, Canadian Polar Commission,
Meridian (Fall/Winter 2007), 6–11, at 8; available at <http://www.polarcom.gc.ca/media.
php?mid=3278>.
36
For an analysis of the pitfalls involved provided by an experienced former icebreaker captain
with the Canadian Coast Guard, see ibid. Toomey (ibid., at 8–9), asserts that the great savings
associated with the direct route across the Pole will be realized much later than coastal routes
as “only very ice capable ships will be able to use it for many years to come, and ice will always
cause either damage or delays.” He also suggests that Russia is best placed among the Arctic
coastal states to take advantage of these emerging Arctic navigational opportunities.
37
For recent Canadian and US perspectives on this issue see Byers and Lalonde, supra note
30; J. Kraska, “The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage”, International
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2007) 22 (2): 257–282.
38
For a detailed analysis of the legal issues surrounding the Northwest Passage see: D. Pharand
“The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A ﬁnal revisit” (2007) Ocean Development and
International Law 38: 3–69.
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somewhat premature. It is by no means inevitable that these routes will
become swiftly and reliably open and navigable.39
Polar Flag Waving
Finally, the geopolitical aspects of extended continental shelf claims should
not be discounted. Even though senior Russian oﬃcials have emphasised that
Russia is acting in accordance with international law (see below), there is no
doubt that the symbolic planting of the Russian ﬂag at the North Pole served
to invest a legitimate process with geopolitical weight and signiﬁcance. In
particular, Russia’s action was greeted with great fanfare in the domestic political context40 and illustrates a more robust posture internationally.

Arctic Maritime Claims
Despite media portrayals of recent events in the Arctic as constituting some
kind of land grab, the past and present conduct of the Arctic Ocean littoral
states has been predominantly in accordance with international law and particularly the LOSC.41 All the Arctic Ocean coastal states, with the notable
exception of the USA, are LOSC parties.42 At the time of writing, ratiﬁcation
of the LOSC was once again on the agenda in the US. Arguably recent events
in the Arctic may be a positive inﬂuence in this regard; however, the question

39

Byers and Lalonde, supra note 30, at 4, and Toomey, supra note 35.
Russian President Putin reportedly stated that the planting of the Russian ﬂag at the North
Pole was “fully in line with Russia’s strategic interests.” With regard to press reaction, Rossiiskaya Gazeta’s declaration that Russia’s action and the division of the Arctic heralded “the
start of a new distribution of the world” was perhaps the most dramatic claim. See, for example, M. Moore, “Russia Arctic stunt celebrated by Moscow press”, The Daily Telegraph
(London), 4 August 2007.
41
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, Jamaica, 10 December
1982 (in force as from 16 November 1994), Publication No. E97.V10 (New York, United
Nations, 1983). See, for example, I. Townsend-Gault, “Not a carve-up: Canada, sovereignty
and the Arctic Ocean”, International Zeitschrift (2007)1(3) (August), available at <www.
zeitschrift.co.uk/>.
42
See United Nations, Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the
Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for
the implementation of the Convention relating to the conservation and management of straddling
ﬁsh stocks and highly migratory ﬁsh stocks (United Nations, New York, updated to 26 October
2007), available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_ﬁles/status2007.pdf >.
40
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of US ratiﬁcation of the LOSC remains controversial.43 All of these states,
without exception, have also advanced claims to zones of maritime jurisdiction in accordance with those provided for under the LOSC.44 It is worth
emphasising, in the context of these misleading reports, that the EEZ claims
that encircle the Arctic Ocean, and the extended continental shelf rights in
the central Arctic Ocean beyond 200 nm from the coast, are necessarily claims
to speciﬁc sovereign rights as laid down in the LOSC and not to sovereignty
over these areas, as implied by the current media discourse concerning alleged
“land grabs” and the like.
While the USA is not a party to the LOSC, it pursues a policy consistent
with the LOSC. Indeed, as the world’s pre-eminent maritime power, the USA
has taken a conservative or restrictive view in respect of maritime claims and
has routinely protested against what it views as excessive maritime claims.45
This is illustrated, for example, by the fact that the USA, alone among the
Arctic Ocean littoral states, has not claimed straight baselines along its coasts
and has taken exception to the baselines claimed by some of the other Arctic
claimant states. It should be acknowledged that the application of baselines in
the context of ice-covered coasts is problematic and this issue has generated
debate.46
With regard to maritime boundary delimitation, while the majority of
potential maritime boundaries have yet to be delimited, this is hardly remarkable in a global context.47 While maritime disputes do exist in the region,

43
See E. Schor, “Republican rightwingers ﬁnd an Iraq-on-sea”, The Guardian, 25 October 2007;
Sands, supra note 3.
44
For a summary of these claims see R. R. Churchill, “Claims to maritime zones in the Arctic—law of the sea normality or polar peculiarity?”, A. G. Oude Elferink and D. R. Rothwell
(eds.) The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction (Martinus Nijhoﬀ,
The Hague, 2001), at 105–124.
45
This is accomplished through the US’s Freedom of Navigation Program. See J. A. Roach
and R. W. Smith, United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims (Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers, The Hague, 1996).
46
For discussion of this issue in the Arctic context see, for example, J. R.V. Prescott and C. H.
Schoﬁeld, Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers, Leiden,
2005), at 520–521.
47
For reviews of these maritime delimitations see A. G. Oude Elferink, “Arctic Maritime
Delimitations: The preponderance of similarities with other regions”, in Elferink and Rothwell
(eds.), supra note 44, at 179–199; Prescott and Schoﬁeld, supra note 46, at 519–530. See also
A. G. Oude Elferink, “Maritime delimitation between Denmark/Greenland and Norway”,
Ocean Development and International Law (2007) 38: 375–380 for details of this agreement
concluded in 2006.
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notably between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea48 and Canada and the
USA in the Beaufort Sea,49 prospects for the delimitation of boundaries in the
Arctic are enhanced by the lack of territorial disputes. The exception to this
rule is Canada and Denmark’s sovereignty dispute over Hans Island, located
in the Nares Strait between Ellesmere Island and Greenland. However, this
dispute did not prevent the parties from concluding a continental shelf boundary agreement in 1973, using an equidistance line as a basis for delimitation.50
The innovative feature of this agreement is that not only was Hans island
wholly discounted in the construction of the boundary line, but the line is
actually discontinuous in order to accommodate the disputed island.51
The retreat of hitherto permanent ice in the Arctic has the potential to
complicate matters, however, by revealing additional land territory that could,
theoretically, be subject to competing sovereignty claims. In late October 2007
it was reported that a small island dubbed “Stray Dog West” had been discovered around 2.5 miles oﬀ the northern coast of Greenland.52 While there
seems to be little doubt that this particular islet will be considered part of
Greenland and thus under Danish sovereignty, it is perhaps not entirely inconceivable that other features may be revealed in more contentious locations as
ice cover melts, leading to further sovereignty disputes analogous to that over
Hans Island.
If the Arctic is arguably generally unremarkable in terms of maritime claims
and boundaries within 200 nm of the coast, the same cannot be said of claims

48

Although Norway and Russia announced that they had signed a maritime boundary agreement on 11 July 2007, the accord appears to clarify, update and reconﬁrm an agreement dating from 1957 and extends it into the southern Barents Sea. The two countries’ overlapping
claims further north in the Barents Sea and their dispute over Norway’s maritime claims from
Spitsbergen (Svalbard) remain unresolved. See “Agreement signed between Norway and Russia
on maritime delimitation in the Varangerfjord area”, Press Release, No.83/07, Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, 11 July 2007. Available at <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/
ud/Press-Contacts/News/2007/Agreement-signed-between-Norway-and-Russ.html?id=476347>;
Elferink, supra note 47, at 181 and 185–190; Prescott and Schoﬁeld, supra note 46, at 524–
526; Elferink, supra note 47, at 190–194;
49
H. Gray, “Canada’s unresolved maritime boundaries”, Boundary and Security Bulletin (1997)
5 (3) (Autumn): 61–70, at 63–65; Prescott and Schoﬁeld, supra note 46, at 526.
50
See J. I. Charney and L. M. Alexander (eds.) International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. I
(Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers, The Hague, 1993), at 371–385; Gray, supra note 49, at 69.
51
The boundary stops just short of the island to the south of the island at Point 122 and then
continues just to the north from Point 123. See ibid. and Prescott and Schoﬁeld, supra note
46, at 265.
52
The islet reportedly stands up to 12 feet (3.7 m) above sea level and is a 125–feet-long
(38 m) depositional feature, meaning that it is vulnerable to erosion under moving pack-ice in
winter. See “New land surfaces in Arctic tug-of-war”, Reuters, 31 October 2007.
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beyond EEZ limits. As the Arctic is a semi-enclosed sea almost entirely surrounded by the territories of littoral states, the maritime entitlements of the
coastal states converge. Perhaps inevitably, there is therefore scope for multiple
overlapping claims and disputes over extended continental shelf rights. Certainly there are a number of potential maritime boundaries beyond 200 nm
from the coast in the central Arctic Ocean which have yet to be delimited.53

Determining Outer Continental Shelf Limits in the Arctic Ocean
On 2 August 2007 a Russian expedition used an unmanned submersible to
drop a rust-proof titanium casket containing a Russian ﬂag on the Arctic seabed at around 4,200 m depth beneath the North Pole itself.54 This action
generated considerable media coverage, much of which was decidedly alarmist
in nature. This tone extended to the diplomatic arena when the Canadian
Foreign Minister, Peter MacKay, appeared to dismiss the ﬂag-dropping incident as a stunt, stating “This isn’t the 15th century. You can’t go around the
world and just plant ﬂags and say ‘We’re claiming this territory.’ ”55
Despite the bold rhetoric and febrile tenor of some the reaction, however,
Russia’s exploits are in keeping with the action of the other Arctic coastal
states. The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, observed that “no one is
throwing ﬂags around” and analogies were drawn between Russia’s action and
Hillary and Tenzing planting the Union Jack on the summit of Everest.56 Indeed,
Lavrov was at pains to emphasise that Russia was not acting unilaterally;
rather, its actions were “in strict compliance with international law.”57 This
view was echoed by the Russian scientiﬁc establishment. For example, Victor
Posyolov of the Russian Institute of Ocean Geology reportedly stated that:
“A unilateral annexation of the area by Russia is impossible. We will strictly
abide by the UN Convention.”58 This point is crucial. In fact, all of the Arctic
states appear to be acting in accordance with international law.
53

Elferink, supra note 47, at 195–197; Prescott and Schoﬁeld, supra note 46, at 523–529.
It appears, somewhat bizarrely, that some of the Russian footage purporting to show this
was “lifted” from the opening sequence of the Hollywood movie Titanic. See T. Parﬁtt,
“Revealed: why those Russian submarine heroics might have looked a little familiar”, The
Guardian, 11 August 2007.
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See “Canada dismisses Russia’s ‘15th-century stunt’ of claiming North Pole”, The Australian, 4 August 2007, T. Parﬁtt, “Russia’s Arctic Claim”, The Guardian, 10 August 2007.
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See “Russia guided by international law in its Polar Shelf probe”, RIA Novosti, 3 August
2007. See also Townsend-Gault, supra note 41.
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Although subsequent Danish59 and US60 scientiﬁc expeditions were portrayed in the media as reactions to Russia’s Arctic moves, in reality these surveying eﬀorts were long planned. Such activities reﬂect the way in which all
the Arctic coastal states are engaged in research designed to establish linkage
between submarine areas beyond 200 nm from the coast and their respective
continental margins in order to bolster their claims ahead of submissions to
the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(CLCS or the Commission). Indeed, these activities have in large part been
prompted by looming deadlines for such submissions (see below). In contrast,
the timing of Canada’s declaration, in the course of a three-day tour of the
Arctic by the Prime Minister Stephen Harper, that it would be reinforcing
its own Arctic claims, notably through the establishment of a cold-weather
ﬁghting training centre at Resolute Bay and a deep-water port at Nanisivik on
Baﬃn Island, together with the recruitment of 900 troops to reinforce Canada’s largely voluntary force of Rangers, in order to ‘monitor’ potential activity
in the Arctic’s Northwest Passage and reinforce territorial claims, appear to be
more of a reaction to the furore surrounding Russia’s claims.61
In fact, Russia was the ﬁrst state in the world to submit a claim to the
CLCS.62 Part of this 2001 claim relates to the Arctic Ocean beyond 200 nm
from the coast. This claim, reportedly encompassing approximately 460,000
square miles of seabed,63 provoked adverse comment from other Arctic claimant states.64 Canada, Norway and Japan’s responses simply served to reserve
their positions, especially with regard to undelimited maritime boundaries
that each state shares with Russia.65 The USA, however, indicated that in its
view the Russian submission contained serious ﬂaws.66 The CLCS responded
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Perhaps ironically given the supposed ongoing competition amongst the Arctic littoral
states, this expedition took place with the assistance of a chartered Russian nuclear-powered
icebreaker. See, for example, “Danish team heads for North Pole”, BBC News, 13 August
2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6941134.stm>; Leapman, supra note 1.
60
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“NOAA Coast Survey continues sea ﬂoor mapping expedition in the Arctic”, United States
Coast Guard, Press Release, 13 August 2007, available at <www.uscg.mil/pacarea/healy/>.
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BBC News, 10 August 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6939732.stm>.
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See <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_ﬁles/submission_rus.htm>.
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Baev, supra note 18.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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in 2002, indicating that Russia should make a revised submission.67 One of
the objectives of the recent Russian expedition, and previous expeditions, was
to gather information, notably concerning the linkage between the Mendeleev
and Lomonosov Ridges to the Russian continental margin, to be included in
Russia’s revised submission.68
Norway followed suit and made a submission to the CLCS in November 2006,
which likewise elicited responses from interested states.69 Canada’s deadline
for submission is in 2013 and in Denmark’s case it is 2014. As the USA is a
non-Party to the LOSC, unsurprisingly no deadline for submission to the
CLCS has been set.
The question of extended continental shelf claims in accordance with Article 76
of the LOSC is undoubtedly both legally and scientiﬁcally fraught and numerous “complexities and ambiguities” associated with Article 76 have been identiﬁed,70
as well as problems in respect of the way in which the Commission works.71
In the Arctic context, it appears that it may be possible for the coastal states
to advance legitimate claims to most of the seabed of the Arctic Ocean.72 Two
related analyses of potential extended shelf limits in the Arctic Ocean are particularly instructive on this issue.73 In 2000 it was suggested that the whole of
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session of the General Assembly, A/57/57/Add.1, paras. 27–41, at para. 41. See <http://
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69
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R.Macnab, “The Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean”, in M. H.
Nordquist, J. N. Moore and T. H. Heidar (eds.) Legal and Scientiﬁc Aspects of Continental Shelf
Limits (Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers, Leiden, 2004), pp. 301–311. Macnab has also provided
a very useful analysis of “sources of ambiguity in the implementation of Article 76”. See
R. Macnab, “The case for transparency in the delimitation of the outer continental shelf in accordance with LOSC Article 76”, Ocean Development and International Law (2004) 35: 1–17, at
2–9. Generally see also P. J. Cook and C. M.Carleton (eds.) Continental Shelf Limits: The
Scientiﬁc and Legal Interface (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000).
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(2002) 17 (3): 301–324.
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and Rothwell (eds.), supra note 44, at 139–156.
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the seabed of the Arctic Ocean might well be subject to coastal state claims,
with the exception of two ‘donut holes’ beyond national jurisdiction in the
central Arctic Ocean.74 This study was revised in 2004 in light of the Commission’s apparent response to Russia’s submission.75 In particular the Russian
submission contended that the Mendeleev and Lomonosov Ridges were submerged prolongations of the Russian landmass. It is understood, however,
that the Commission remained unconvinced.76
While a certain amount of what might be termed educated guesswork was
required, given the conﬁdential nature of the Commission’s communications
with Russia, this follow-up analysis indicated that two further potential ‘donut
holes’ may exist, related to the aforementioned Alpha/Mendeleev and Lomonosov
Ridges (see map).77
A critical issue in this context is the issue of distinguishing between “submarine elevations” and “submarine ridges” and the application of cut-oﬀ lines
to such features.78 This issue is complex, contentious and has generated considerable debate.79 The language used in Article 76 on this issue has been
termed “manifestly unhelpful”80 and has not been substantially clariﬁed by
the Commission’s Scientiﬁc and Technical Guidelines, which merely state:
“the issue of ridges will be examined on a case-by-case basis.”81 While frustrating for coastal states faced with the task of formulating a submission, this
illustrates the diﬃculties encountered by the drafters of the LOSC and the
Commissioners themselves in developing rules applicable to all geographical,
geological and geomorphological circumstances.82
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Indeed, the time-consuming and expensive process of preparing a submission to the CLCS where ridges are involved has been likened to a high-stakes
card game, though one where not only are the players unsure of the rules and
thus of the value of their cards, but where the dealer (that is, the Commission)
may ultimately rule a player’s hand to be essentially worthless: “At the end of
the game, a coastal state may discover that not only did it misjudge the value
of the cards that it was holding, but that it played them all wrong.”83
This unpleasant scenario is exacerbated by the conﬁdentiality requirements
surrounding the Commission’s recommendations and decision-making process.84 This secrecy means that coastal states preparing submissions remain
largely in the dark as to why, for example, a particular submission was accepted
or rejected. It is therefore diﬃcult for future claimant states to utilise the experience of those states that have gone before and beneﬁt from previous state
practice in analogous situations. Consequently, a submitting state may “make
the same faulty assumptions concerning ridges and elevations that caused
problems for other coastal states”, forcing a costly and time-consuming reevaluation and resubmission as a result.85 Unfortunately this situation may
also result in “suspicion and scepticism” on the part of interested states denied
access, on the basis of conﬁdentiality, to the data used to justify a particular
submission, and indeed the Commission’s rationale for accepting such a submission, potentially breeding “concerns about the impartiality and the integrity of the process.”86 It has also been observed that at the current rate at which
submissions are assessed—two per annum—the CLCS will be in existence for
a considerable time to come, perhaps until 2035.87
In this context, the beneﬁts of cooperative, or at least coordinated, approaches
in the Arctic (and elsewhere) have been emphasised.88 This could allow for the
development of common methodologies and, potentially, for data sharing.
Contrasting analytical approaches and methodologies may well lead to
diﬀerent limits being constructed from the same data, illustrating that interpretation can have a major role, for instance in the subjective choice of the
location of the foot of the slope where several options are available. With
regard to data, all the Arctic coastal states face problems associated with data
83
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collection in the Arctic (ironically this may be made signiﬁcantly easier as a
result of the removal of sea ice if this comes to pass as mentioned above).89 The
pooling of data could lead, for example, to the construction of common models of bathymetry and sediment thickness.90 Where diﬀering data sets are in
use amongst claimants (which is certainly the case as a result of conﬁdentiality
in respect of data holdings), claimant states are also likely to calculate dissimilar limits even when applying the same analytical techniques.
Cooperative or coordinated submissions to the CLCS are, however, hampered by the fact that, as noted above, not all the coastal states are parties to
the LOSC and that those that are became parties at diﬀerent times, resulting
in diﬀerent deadlines for submission to the CLCS. This has led to a lack of
synchronisation amongst the priorities and submission timetables of the interested states.91
Although suggesting cooperation may seem far-fetched in light of recent
reports emphasising competing claims and disputes among the Arctic littoral
states, the arguments in favour, in light of the issues and challenges outlined
above, are compelling. In fact, despite discussion of cooperation apparently
falling on deaf ears, at the formal political and diplomatic levels at least, and
the culture of secrecy that seems to surround the preparation and consideration of extended continental shelf submissions, there are some indications of
progress. Cooperation at the informal and technical levels has been proceeding for numerous years, for example resulting in the production of the International Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean (IBCAO).92 Furthermore,
the fact remains that multiple potential maritime boundaries beyond 200 nm
from the coast exist in the central Arctic. The CLCS will not rule on these
issues, as its ﬁndings are expressly without prejudice to delimitation.93 Negotiations between the coastal states are therefore inevitable at some point if
these boundaries are to be delimited.
The recent announcement on the part of the governments of Denmark and
Greenland that they would host a “high-level” meeting on the Arctic in Illulisat, Greenland, in May 2008, perhaps represents a positive development in
this regard.
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Threats to the Changing Arctic
This paper has highlighted that many threats to the Arctic environment and
its peoples will occur from global and regional climatic shifts and associated
increased human activity. While the duration, extent and mix of socio-economic
activities are open to conjecture, it is likely that in the Arctic terrestrial and
marine environment, economic activity will grow as regional warming patterns evolve.94
The Arctic is home to a number of environmental threats, due to its proximity to human populations and as a recipient of hazardous material. Pollutants, such as radionuclides, heavy metals, and persistent organic pollutants,
are in many cases generated elsewhere and transported by long-range atmospheric mechanisms.95 Across the region, threats from pollutants exist from
economic activities such as mining, heavy industry, tourism, shipping, mineral
resource development and military activities.96 In addition, the harvesting and
management of marine living resources such as Arctic Cod, a straddling and
high seas stock between Norway and Russia, are a cause for concern.97
The dramatic increase of temperatures, as highlighted in the ACIA,
and the melting of glacial and sea ice represent a ‘step change’ in the nature
of impacts within and external to the Arctic. The rise in global average sea
levels, partly driven by melting glacial ice in Greenland and the Antarctic, is
an issue of considerable concern. As noted in the IPCC 4th Assessment
Report, sea level could potentially rise by 0.6 m by 2099, threatening lowlying areas and islands of countries such as Bangladesh, the Netherlands and
the Maldives.98
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Within the Arctic region itself, a warming environment will result in signiﬁcant impacts on natural and human systems. The ACIA identiﬁes the
region as very sensitive to climatic changes.99 Impacts on the environment
include the shifting of vegetation zones and ecosystem-scale changes to Arctic
habitats. Changes to species migration and breeding behaviour, foraging ecology, and the introduction of invasive species will lead to altered diversity,
distribution and abundance of species.100 In terms of coastal communities in
the Arctic and the four million people living in the region, impacts from a
warming climate include damage to infrastructure from melting permafrost
and coastal erosion, and impacts on health, water supply and local economies.101 Indigenous cultures are closely linked with the Arctic environment
and will be subject to impacts that will inﬂuence the loss of traditional culture
and way of life in the Arctic.102
The retreat of summer sea ice presents an additional range of impacts and
opportunities, depending on one’s perspective. It is plausible that sustainable
economic development in the region could beneﬁt regional communities and
Arctic states, even if some of the opportunities identiﬁed above, notably in
terms of seabed resource development and navigation, remain unrealised for
the foreseeable future. However, unregulated, uncoordinated and inappropriate activities, cumulative in nature in a sensitive environment, may present
signiﬁcant risks to the environmental quality of the Arctic.
With regard to navigation, for example, enhanced traﬃc involves increased
risks of maritime accidents and the capacity of coastal states to deal with such
an eventuality, both in terms of rescuing those involved and addressing the
environmental impacts of, for example, a major oil spill. Recent accidents in
both Polar Regions involving tourist operations serve to highlight the issue. In
August 2007, the collapse of a glacier onto the Alexey Maryshev oﬀ Svalbard
resulted in injuries to 46 tourists. In November 2007,103 the M/S Explorer
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sank in the Antarctic, necessitating the emergency evacuation of 154 passengers and crew.104 It is clear that such ‘expedition cruising’ in remote and potentially hazardous waters is growing and it can be reasonably anticipated that
this growth will continue.105 In December 2007, Norway experienced its second largest oil spill, with 25,000 barrels of oil escaping into the North Sea
from the Statfjord oil ﬁeld site, 124 miles west oﬀ the Norwegian coast. The
incident has further raised concerns about anticipated future expansion of
hydrocarbon extraction in the Barents Sea.106 It has also been suggested that
increased maritime traﬃc will also lead to other undesirable impacts which
will, in turn, pose signiﬁcant security and enforcement challenges to Arctic
states.107 The interpretation and application by states of the requirement in
Article 234 of the LOSC to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory environmental provisions in the face of increasing shipping will be a source of future
legal debate.108
It is clear that in the Arctic mineral resources are of strategic importance
and predominantly fall under the jurisdiction of Arctic states.109 However, as
this paper has discussed, the extent of mineral resource reserves and operational
capacity is highly uncertain and certainly long term in nature. Any future development must proceed with the mitigation of environmental impacts as its highest priority and as part of a shared vision from Arctic states. In addition to
mineral resources, exploitation of living resources will emerge as another economic opportunity with the retreat of summer sea ice. There are signiﬁcant
gaps in the management of high seas stocks in the Arctic, particularly outside
the jurisdiction of the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC)110
and multilateral agreements, such as the trilateral Loophole agreement between
Norway, Russia and Iceland.111 It is likely that new regional ﬁsheries manage-
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ment agreements may have to be considered for the Arctic high seas in order
to safeguard stocks. The movement of stocks due to changing environmental
conditions and the increase of maritime activity will cause further pressures
on managing existing Arctic ﬁsheries. This includes coastal, port and market
state responses to incidences of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)
ﬁshing and the governance of high seas stocks under changing physical conditions, against the backdrop of undelimited international boundaries and thus
overlapping maritime claims. An example is the ongoing issue of sustainable
management of productive Barents Sea ﬁsheries including Arctic cod, herring,
haddock and capelin. This region has been heavily ﬁshed since the 1950s and
is a key supply of seafood for Europe. Issues of overﬁshing and IUU pressures
on stocks combined with the uncertainties from climate impacts raise complex
issues for future management.112

Oceans Governance Challenges
Governance in the Arctic occurs through a mix of domestic and international
legal instruments and “soft law” regional agreements. The foundation for
regional action has been the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 1991,
which was superseded by the Arctic Council in 1996.113 The Arctic Council is
a ‘high level forum to provide a means for prompting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states with the involvement of the
Arctic indigenous communities . . . on common Arctic issues’.114 The Arctic
refer to: European Environment Agency, “Arctic Environment: European Perspectives. Why
should Europe care?” (2004) European Environment Agency, Copenhagen, 59 pp, at 19.
112
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tonnes for cod and 36,000 tonnes for haddock. In 2006, calculations show that Russian ﬁshing
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Council is not an international organisation with legal personality,115 but an
international forum between Arctic states and permanent participants that
represent indigenous nations of the Arctic. Its mandate is to build cooperation
and interaction across six working groups.116 In addition to the Arctic Council, several regional organisations have emerged over the past decade to address
a variety of governance issues such as indigenous capacity building, European
and Russian cooperation, and sustainable development.117
Over recent years questions have been raised by commentators over whether
the existing regime is suﬃcient to protect and manage the Arctic or whether a
new regime is required in the face of considerable environmental change and
increasing socio-economic activity.118 Despite the presence and continuity of
this debate, the dominant paradigm in the Arctic is one of state sovereignty
(or, frequently, sovereign rights in the maritime sphere) and cooperation
via regional instruments.119 In the medium term, it is likely that future socioeconomic pressure driven by Arctic environmental changes will operate within
this existing legal framework.
Although domestic laws control development and environmental management in areas under national jurisdiction, these laws are inﬂuenced by international commitments, particularly in areas relating to the marine environment.
International regimes concerning climate change, biodiversity, ﬁsheries, trade
and environmental protection are enacted by some or all of the Arctic states,
but their application remains patchy, and many of the problems, such as climate change, require solutions stretching far beyond the Arctic. As Arctic
states have opted to pursue a “soft law” voluntary regime focusing on the
coordination of scientiﬁc research, environmental management and sustainable development, eﬀorts to protect and manage the Arctic can suﬀer from a
‘lowest common denominator’ eﬀect, where a lack of action by one or more
states can undermine or hinder the eﬀective action of others. In addition, this
approach builds in a lack of multilateral binding enforceable targets and avoids
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a level playing ﬁeld for environmental protection and management activities.
On the other hand, the current regionalist approach characterised by the Arctic
Council has been identiﬁed by commentators as moderately successful and
realistic but potentially due for reform120 as greater international attention is
focused on the Arctic.
With the signiﬁcant present and future changes occurring in the Arctic
environment from climatic change and with the corresponding increase in
geopolitical and commercial activity, the Arctic faces a complex and challenging future. This paper identiﬁes three scenarios for future governance arrangements—that of an existing or ‘status quo’ regime, a mixed reform regime, and
a binding international regime.
The continuance of the existing and moderately successful soft law regime
in the Arctic is a highly likely scenario, particularly in the context that Arctic
coastal states are unlikely to relinquish their sovereignty to a larger binding
international regime.121 In addition, the divergence of political opinion over
the future use of the Arctic, together with continued geopolitical positioning,122 render it diﬃcult for establishment of a binding agreement and leads to
the notion of progressing within existing boundaries. As noted by Stokke, a
‘ﬂexible approach to norm building’123 within existing frameworks would
appear to be a likely way to move forward on diﬃcult issues and continue
to improve regional environmental governance on issues such as monitoring
and impact assessment, coordinating and harmonising regulations, promoting cleaner production and reducing pollution. In addition, sovereign states,
bound by domestic legislation and increasing international commitments,
have primary responsibility for performance on environmental standards
and implementation of responsibilities under international regimes such as
the LOSC. This scenario continues to promote Arctic issues on the world
stage whilst at the same time preserving the geopolitical status quo and avoiding the governance complexities from an increasingly active and changing
Arctic.
A mixed reform regime would seek to reform the existing governance
approach identiﬁed above. It would actively seek to address the ineﬃciencies
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and gaps of the existing ‘unambitious regime’124 and move toward proactively
addressing Arctic issues where clear reform is needed. This could be a likely
scenario where Arctic coastal states and other states with interests in the region
move ahead on an issue-by-issue basis under international frameworks such as
the LOSC, particularly in the context of Article 122 on regional cooperation
in (semi-)enclosed seas.125 This approach would retain the principle of sovereign control in the Arctic but increase cooperation and move forward on the
diﬃcult and emerging multilateral issues. Commentators have noted that there
is a legal, and arguably moral, imperative for Arctic states to cooperate on transboundary issues of common concern, particularly under the banner of scientiﬁc
research as operates under the Antarctic Treaty.126 For example, there is a clear
gap in the current regime for straddling stocks and high seas ﬁsheries management in the Arctic.127 With climate-induced changes in the distribution and
abundance of ﬁsheries,128 new pressures will emerge on the management of
stocks. The LOSC, through the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, strongly
encourages the development of regimes to conserve and manage ﬁsh stocks
that straddle national boundaries and the high seas. A regional treaty on high
seas, migratory and straddling Arctic stocks could replace the existing complicated bilateral, trilateral and multilateral agreements currently in place and
take a precautionary approach to management of ﬁsheries not under national
jurisdiction and under changing biophysical conditions. In addition, reform
could be made to the protection of Arctic biodiversity129 through strengthening existing domestic action under international agreements, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, and promoted through the Arctic Council;
strengthening existing international regimes such as the Convention for
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the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (the
“OSPAR Convention”) or ﬁshery regimes such as the NEAFC; or through
development of a new international regime to cover high seas issues. Commentators have suggested that negotiations under the LOSC for management
of areas beyond national jurisdiction may provide a catalyst for nations to
agree that cooperation and sustainable development is an appropriate outcome in the face of regional claims and tensions.130
The ﬁnal scenario of a new comprehensive binding international regime,
i.e., an ‘Arctic Treaty’, is an unlikely outcome. Clear reform is needed within
the existing Arctic system, particularly in relation to a clear vision with established targets and the ability to address emerging transboundary problems.
However, it is yet to be demonstrated that Arctic states have the political will
or desire to move in this direction, with eﬀort focused on moderately successful voluntary approaches. Several ideas have been discussed in consideration
of a binding pan-Arctic treaty mechanism loosely based on the ‘Antarctic’
model.131
There is a continuing expansion of international agreements and treaties
concerning the regulation of the environment and maritime aﬀairs globally as
well as across Arctic states. The many regional, bilateral and multilateral agreements on pollution, resource exploitation, maritime and security issues lead to
a highly complex regulatory environment in the Arctic. Arctic states are clearly
reluctant to yield domestic power to an international authority in the Arctic.
However, a binding treaty does merit further ongoing debate, especially as a
means to harmonise the various environmental commitments embedded in
international treaties and enacted via states. The emerging negotiations on
determining the extended continental shelf, the mooted action of the US in
ratifying the LOSC, and the ongoing changes in the Arctic environment may
potentially provide the backdrop for a discussion based on the common good
rather than national self-interest.
Overall, the future of governance in the Arctic is ﬁlled with uncertainty and
change. Change is coming from many directions, from the underlying physical and biological ecosystem driven by climatic warming, from geopolitical
stances from the Arctic states, and in a resurgent interest in the potential or
actual living and non-living resources of the region. While many forecasts of
driving forces contain elements of uncertainty, best international practice
would develop and apply a precautionary and multilateral approach to the
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issues, backed by scientiﬁc research, an Arctic vision, and the political will to
act on identiﬁed key issues of concern, such as resource sustainability and
maritime jurisdictional claims. Whether these approaches evolve via a continuation of the status quo, a limited reform approach, or a new international
regime is yet to be determined, but it is hoped that the future of the Arctic is
one of sustainable development, peace and international cooperation.
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